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I. Introduction 
 Nudges have sparked the interest of some moral philosophers, many of whom have 
thought that there is something ethically unsettling about nudges because of the sort of 
relationship between a government and its citizens that they entail or because of what nudges do 
to the deliberative capacities of people who are nudged.  Daniel M. Hausman and Brynn Welch 
argue that nudges “may threaten the individual’s control over her own choosing” and claim that 
to “the extent that they are attempts to undermine that individual’s control over her own 
deliberation, as well as her ability to assess for herself her alternatives, they are prima facie as 
threatening to liberty, broadly understood, as is overt coercion” (2010).  Jeremy Waldron 
suggests that there is a “genuine worry” about Cass Sunstein’s advocacy of nudges, and thinks 
that there is “an element of insult” in Sunstein’s nudging (2014).  For these and other 
philosophers, nudges raise ethical concerns primarily or exclusively when used by governments 
to encourage their citizens to behave in particular ways and governments have at least a pro tanto 
reason to avoid nudging their citizens.  
 In this paper, I reconstruct the moral philosophers’ objections to nudges, explaining why 
we might think that nudges contain “an element of insult.”  I begin by considering and rejecting 
as overly simplistic interpretations of the moral philosophers’ objection that focus on either how 
nudges diminish the number of choices that people make or how nudges aim to modify people’s 
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behavior without engaging with their rational capacities.  I suggest that a more charitable 
interpretation of the moral philosopher’s objection, according to which nudges are morally 
worrisome insofar as they undermine democratic control of default rules by making it more 
difficult for people to detect that the choice architecture in which they operate has been actively 
shaped by policymakers.  I argue that this version of the objection to nudges is not really a worry 
about nudges, as a policy category, but a worry about compromising the integrity of individual 
decision-making in certain important contexts.  Governments do not, then, have a pro tanto 
reason to refrain from nudging.  Instead, governments ought to consider whether particular 
nudges prevent people from directly engaging with the reasons and values that bear on a decision 
that it is morally important for them to make for themselves.  Finally, I discuss how governments 
might determine whether nudges in the field of healthcare are likely to interfere with the 
independence of such decisions. 
II. Nudges and Respect for Choice 
 A central feature of moral philosophers’ criticisms of nudges is a claim that, in some 
manner, nudges fail to respect nudgees as individual choosers, whether by failing to show 
appropriate regard for the choices that they make or by treating people as lacking the rational 
capacities that are central to the practice of choosing.2  Waldron, for instance, claims that when I 
am nudged, “my choosing is being made a mere means to my ends by somebody else” (Waldron 
2014).  Waldron “think[s] this is what the concern about dignity is all about” (Ibid.).  My 
choosing is treated as a mere means when a nudge fails to take seriously my capacities for 
deliberation as a part of me, and the fact that when I do something because I choose to do it, I 
invest my action with self-respect (Ibid.).  In this section, I explore why we might think that 
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nudges fail to respect my choosing.  I first consider two obvious interpretations of the moral 
philosophers’ objection to nudges and reject both as overly simplistic.  I then propose that the 
best understanding of the objection to nudges focuses on the possibility that nudges could 
undermine democratic control of choice architecture.   
A. What the Moral Philosophers’ Objection to Nudges Is Not 
 One very straightforward interpretation of the objection to nudges, which is advanced by 
some libertarian critics of nudging, holds that nudges disrespect me as a chooser because they 
reduce the number of options that I have to choose from, or the number of choices that I must 
make.  But it is a truism that having more choices does not straightforwardly enhance my agency.  
In many contexts, having more choices limits both my welfare, by forcing me to make choices I 
would rather not make (like which health insurance plan to enroll in), and my autonomy, by 
forcing me to expend deliberative resources making choices that are not central to my agency 
(Sunstein 2015).  If I am nudged by my insurance to choose an optometrist from a relatively 
small network of optometrists, I might spend less time deliberating about which dentist to use 
and more time deliberating about things that matter much more to me.  So the complaint that 
nudges fail to respect nudgees as choosers cannot plausibly amount to the claim that nudges 
reduce the number of choices that people have. 
 We might instead think that this objection concerns the manner that nudges interact with 
individuals’ rational choice-making capacities.  Nudges do not induce nudgees to behave in 
manner that promotes their own or third-party welfare or deliberation through rational persuasion.  
Sometimes nudges consist in providing information, like graphic warnings on cigarette packages 
about the health effects of smoking.   But nudges differ from argumentation in that, even when 
they consist in the providing information, they achieve their objectives through sub-rational 
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processes.  Graphic cigarette warnings “nudges” smokers to pay more attention to the long-term 
health effects of smoking not by providing an explanation of why they should focus my 
reasoning about cigarette purchases on long-term health consequences, but by relying on my 
reflexive response to the warning.  Nudges may constitute a substitution of nudger’s judgment 
for my own, such that “my choosing is being made a mere means to my ends by somebody else” 
(Waldron 2014), because they aim to elicit a specific behavior from me other than by rationally 
persuading me that I should behave in that way.   
 While this interpretation of the objection to nudges is more plausible than the first version 
that I considered, it remains unappealing.  Our human rational agency is inevitably conditioned 
on and influenced by non-rational processes.  Perhaps we should aspire to free our rational 
decisions from non-rational influences to the greatest extent possible, but it would be odd to 
think that the best way to do this is to reduce the effect of extraneous influences on every single 
choice we make.  Further, it is not clear why we would want to avoid all non-rational 
interferences with deliberation that aim at a particular result.  As the proponents of nudging 
frequently point out, even in the context of important decisions that should be made 
independently, some default rule is often necessary.  Deciding whether to become an organ 
donor is a decision that many people think is an important one that individuals ought to make 
autonomously and with the use of their own rational, deliberative capacities.  But what should 
happen with the organs of someone who has not made a decision about whether to be an organ 
donor or not?  Given that having some default rule is inevitable, should the default be that people 
are organ donors or that they are not?  And if, as humans, it is inevitable that non-rational 
processes impact individual’s rational decision-making so that many people stick with the default 
rule for organ donation, whatever it is, what rationale could there be for setting the default at not 
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being a donor if being a donor is what most people would prefer if they did, in fact, give serious 
consideration to the question of whether to be an organ donor?  It seems that even the fact that a 
nudge has the potential to make a particular outcome to a particular important decision more 
likely (other than by rational persuasion) is not, by itself, reason to be suspicious of nudges.3   
B. Nudges and Democratic Control 
 Part of why nudges seem unlikely to impermissibly interfere with the independence of 
reasoning by individuals any more than rational persuasion or mandates is that nudges tend to 
succeed and fail at the level of populations.  Consider an employer that changes the health 
insurance plan that its employees are enrolled in by default from Plan A, a low premium, high 
deductible plan, to Plan B, a moderate premium, moderate deductible plan, although it allows 
employees to easily choose which of the two plans to enroll in.  The employer makes the change 
because such a plan is likely to be better, financially speaking, for most of its employees.  
Whether changing the default insurance plan succeeds or fails does not depend on whether 
employee X sticks with the default or elects to enroll in a different plan, and it also does not 
depend on whether employee X would be better off with Plan A or Plan B.  There would be no 
good ground to object to the nudge if, in fact, most employees would like to enroll in Plan B and 
only a small number of employees would like Plan A, and if setting Plan A as the default will 
result in more employees enrolling in Plan A than Plan B.  The employer could know that most 
of its employees would prefer Plan B--for instance, by surveying a random sampling of 
employees--it is impossible for the employer to know the health insurance preferences of all of 
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its employees in advance.  The default is going to be the insurance plan that some employees 
want but not what others want, and there must be some default.  Setting Plan B as the default 
looks like the best way to allocate the costs of decision-making to reduce costs as much as 
possible. 
 Focusing on how nudges function at the level of populations suggests that if nudges give 
rise to a moral concern, the concern has to do not with their impact on individual decision-
making but on how they impact the choice architecture that a group of people relies on.  
Defaulting to Plan A seems like a good rule to have if a plurality of employees would, if they 
thought about it, save at that rate.  But consider a nudge to encourage employees to avoid 
financial shocks associated with enplaned healthcare expenditures by setting Plan B as the 
default when, in fact, most employees would choose Plan A if they really thought about it.  This 
nudge looks much more like it fails to respect individual members of the population of 
employees as choosers.  The objection to nudging could be formulated as: 
 
N1: Nudges disrespect nudgees as choosers when they make it more difficult for individual 
nudgees to choose according to the default choice that the collective of nudgees would prefer. 
 
Here, “the default choice that the collective of nudgees would prefer” represents the appropriate 
make based on the appropriate aggregation of individual nudgees’ choices.  If a doctor routinely 
prescribes two versions of a drug, generic and branded, and 90% of patients want a generic and 
10% want a brand-name drug, the majoritarian default choice would be the generic.  According 
to this line of thought, nudges disrespect us as choosers when they treat our choices as something 
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to be modified in pursuit of some further objective that we would not endorse, individually or 
together.  
 This objection needs further refinement because often there may be no fact of the matter 
as to what we would endorse, individually or together.  The problem is not only that, given 
certain assumptions about how to aggregate individual preferences, it may be impossible to 
translate individual preferences into community-wide preferences, but also that individuals may 
not have an answer as to what their highest order desires are (Korobkin 2009).  An insurance 
plan may serve many patients who both want to want the best medicine available (and who think 
brand-name drugs are better than generics) and who want to want good healthcare at an 
affordable price (and who think this is provided by generics).  It may be a rational failing of 
individuals to have unresolved conflicts between their preferences, but one can purchase 
pharmaceuticals without being fully rational.  Even if they were prompted to reflect seriously 
about their higher order preferences, many customers would not know what they prefer, or might 
simply pick among alternatives for no reason at all.  More abstractly, I might not have fully 
consistent desires about what choices I would like to make.  For instance, I might like to make 
more choices than I possibly could make, given the limited amount of time and the limited 
deliberative resources that I have, and I might not have worked out rules about how to prioritize 
the various choices that I would like to make.  Additionally, figuring out which choices are the 
most important for me to make is the work of a lifetime, not something that I could settle by 
setting aside a couple of hours or even a few days to think about it.  Moreover, in many cases, 
there might not be any default choice that represents an aggregation of individual preferences 
about the default, even in principle.  If this is the case, we might accept that N1 is only an 
objection to nudges in those cases where there is a clear majoritarian default choice.  But 
 8 
thinking about the grounds of a principle that supports showing respect for majoritarian default 
choices can produce a revised objection.  Nudges can fail to respect people as choosers when 
they promote some small set of individuals’ default preferences at the cost of making it (at least 
marginally) more difficult for other people to get what they want.  What matters is democratic 
control of nudges so that it is possible for us, together, to revise nudges if we want to do so.  The 
objection to nudges might then be formulated as: 
 
N2: Nudges disrespect nudgees as choosers when they make it more difficult for nudgees to 
democratically control the relevant choice architecture.  
 
 Nudging patients toward generics and away from name-brands would, then, be subject to 
criticism under N2 if most patients wanted branded drugs, or if most patients were not sure what 
they wanted to want but the nudge made it more difficult for them to exercise control over 
decisions about the default drugs in prescriptions.  Of course, there are many different ways that 
a nudge could be under democratic control: a nudge might be implemented through a referendum, 
through a statute enacted by a legislature, or by an administrative agency overseen by an elected 
executive.  There are many different forms that democratic oversight can take, but more 
significant to determining whether a nudge is subject to criticism under N2 is the aim of the 
nudge.  N2 objects to nudges that have an anti-democratic aim in that they treat some people’s 
preferences or commitments as more important than those of others in determining a default, just 
because of who they are.   
 At this point, we might wonder why nudges, in particular, are a form of policy-making 
that we should worry about.  Why think that there is a pro tanto reason to avoid nudging?  
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Perhaps the thing to avoid is not nudges, but rather failures of democratic oversight of 
policymaking, or counter-democratic aims of government officials.  
 For the moral philosophers’ objection to nudges to work as an objection to nudges 
particularly, it should be able to explain why there is something more morally worrisome about 
nudges than about coercive policies.  The focus on democratic control of choice architecture 
helps to explain how this might happen.  As non-lying deception may be more difficult to detect 
than lies, it may be harder for nudgees to tell when nudging is going on than to tell when more 
coercive policies are in place.4  If a hospital is designed so that its stairs and ramps are attractive 
and obvious, so that patients, visitors, and staff are more likely to walk than take an elevator or 
lift, it is hard for users of the hospital to immediately discern that the placement of stairs is the 
result of a policy that has an aim related to how they should get exercise.  Even if they can tell, in 
the abstract, that the placement of the stairs represents a policy decision, the policy intervention 
is much less salient than would be a prohibition on using elevators by anyone who could take the 
stairs, or, for that matter, a requirement that elevator passengers fill out a waiver acknowledging 
the health risks of not walking enough before going up a few stories.  If the presence of nudges 
in our deliberative environments is more difficult to detect than the presence of more overtly 
coercive policies or than the presence of efforts at rational persuasion, we might think that 
nudges can undermine democratic control of choice architecture.  Rather than thinking about the 
objectives that are being advanced by making stairs obvious and attractive and doing something 
to change the hospital’s architectural decisions if they disagree with its objectives, hospital users 
are likely to go along with the nudge either because they do not notice that it is part of the choice 
architecture or, even if they notice it, because individually, they still have the freedom to take the 
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elevator and so are not very concerned to change the policy.  The involvement of my choice in 
the outcome may make it less likely that I will object to the manner that the choice was set up for 
me.  After all, in the end I got what I wanted and at relatively little cost to me. 
 We might wonder whether nudges rely on this quality of non-transparency to function.  
In many cases, greater transparency might undermine nudges that are prima facie objectionable 
according to N2.  If, collectively, the people enrolled in the insurance plan that nudges them to 
use generics do not want to use generics, the disclosure of the nudge might prompt a large 
number of insureds to actively choose name-brand drugs.  There is a complication, however: the 
members of the insurance plan might prefer brand-name drugs but also have a higher-order 
desire not to have this preference.  They might think that they themselves are irrational for 
wanting branded drugs when generics produce health outcomes that are just as good, and so, 
collectively, they might want not only a generic drug default but also want not to be prompted to 
think about the possibility of opting out by a disclosure.  We might also think that nudges do not 
depend on being hidden to work because even when disclosure about a nudge is provided, 
nudgees are under pressure to see themselves as responsible for what they choose.  Suppose I 
work for an employer that offers health insurance through Plan A (the low premium, high 
deductible plan) and Plan B (the moderate deductible, moderate premium plan), and makes it 
extremely easy to select either plan, but offers Plan A as the default.  If I would rather have Plan 
B but never fill out the very simple form to enroll in Plan B, whether out of procrastination, 
anxiety, laziness, or inattentiveness, and I end up with high out of pocket medical expenses that I 
would have avoided if I selected Plan B, I might blame my employer for not making Plan B the 
default, but I might also blame myself.  Disclaiming responsibility would involve undermining 
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my own rational agency and foregrounding my rational defects, a painful experience that I might 
seek to avoid.   
 We can now formulate a moral claim that is more specifically focused on nudges: 
 
N3: Nudges disrespect nudgees as choosers when they make it more difficult for nudgees to 
democratically control the relevant choice architecture by making the manipulation of 
majoritarian default rules less obvious to nudgees.   
 
This principle echoes Nir Eyal’s suggestion that nudges are morally fine when they put nudgees 
on “automatic pilot” toward a particular course of action but make it easily possible for nudgees 
to abort automatic pilot (2015).  N3 suggests that nudges are morally objectionable when they 
make it difficult for us, collectively, to get off of autopilot.  To the extent that nudges make us 
feel all right about being governed from above, and make it less likely that we will organize 
democratically to change policies that do not suit us, we should be concerned about nudges. 
III. Nudges and Healthcare 
 Some difficulties with the objection to nudging linger.  Suppose that a city with many 
employees offers five health insurance plans, A, B, C, D, and E.  The city changes the default 
insurance plan from A to B, because public health experts tell the city that this will enhance the 
welfare of its employees in the long run.  And suppose that this is a case where there is no 
default rule that the community of nudgees would or could democratically endorse--most 
employees do not know which plan they would choose if they thought about it, and even if they 
spent a lot of time deliberating about which plan to choose, most employees would end up just 
picking a plan more or less at random.  Setting B as the default plan might reduce democratic 
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control of the choice architecture relative to a decision to force employees to make a choice 
among the five plans as a condition of employment or relative to a penalty default rule, like 
making the default insurance plan the one that is obviously worse than the others.  It seems 
strange to think that the city’s nudge is morally problematic.  It is strange to think that it is 
important to maintain a high level of democratic control over every single piece of choice 
architecture, at least as it remains, in principle, possible to exert democratic control.  If anything 
troublesome were happening in the case of the city’s health care plans, it would be because the 
choice that the nudge is designed to shape is one that it is particularly important for individuals 
to make for themselves, by directly engaging with the values that bear on their decision. Seana 
Shiffrin suggests that, “It is valuable to have the opportunity to engage with a particular value, in 
some degree of isolation, to determine its significance to oneself and to respond appropriately to 
the reasons it presents” (Shiffrin 2004). On this picture, choice architecture should not be 
designed in a manner that makes it difficult for people to engage directly with the reasons and 
values that bear on a decision that they face, when the area of decision is one where it is morally 
important for individuals to practice such direct engagement.   
 Consider a cancer patient who has to choose between two courses of treatment, one 
palliative and one involving aggressive chemotherapy, both of which are routinely provided to 
other patients with the same condition.  It might be important that the patient’s deliberations 
about which course of treatment to pursue without being pressured by considerations about 
whether her family will be bankrupted or severely financially strained by one or another of the 
treatment options, or about whether others will disapprove of or be inconvenienced by her 
decision.5  We might think it important instead for the patient to focus directly on values related 
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to her own health and longevity, and some nudges might interfere with the patient’s ability to do 
so.  Indeed, in this situation, providing the patient with either course of treatment as a default 
option might signal to the patient that her healthcare providers would disapprove of her decision 
to pursue the other course of treatment.   
 Sometimes, when things are very important to us, we are unlikely to be swayed by a 
default rule, especially one that provides a very easy mechanism for opting out, because a 
decision that is very important to us is precisely the sort of thing that we are likely to actively 
deliberate about.  However, there are two reasons that we might remain concerned about the 
affect of nudges on decision-making.  First, even in decisions that I regard as very important, 
nudges might interfere with my direct engagement with values, even if they do not prevent 
deliberation.  Setting the default rule for the aforementioned cancer patient as providing 
aggressive chemotherapy might not make it much less likely that the patient will actively 
deliberate about which course of treatment to pursue, but it might undermine the patients ability 
to engage in a focused deliberation about the values of health.  She might take the setting of the 
default rule to indicate that it is appropriate for patients to want aggressive chemotherapy, or that 
her physicians endorse of this treatment option. 
 Second, some decisions that are really important to me can also be very emotionally 
fraught, especially in the context of healthcare.  Deciding between aggressive chemotherapy and 
palliative treatment forces me to confront many different values that may be incompatible with 
one another.  I might care about having a chance to prolong my life, about the environment in 
which I receive healthcare, about avoiding severe pain, and about maintaining cognitive function, 
and I may not be able to preserve access to all of these values that I care deeply about.  This 
could be profoundly anxiety provoking, and might occasion avoidance.  If a default is available, I 
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might take the default as authoritative so that I need not endure the stress of directly engaging 
with the values that bear on a decision about my course of treatment.  This does not end the 
inquiry about whether such a nudge is desirable, because we might have further values that are 
served by making it easy for patients to avoid the anxiety provoked by making emotionally 
difficult decisions about medical treatment.  But it is possible that, while collectively we 
recognize that when faced with such decisions we would be likely to avoid them by relying on 
defaults available to us, we might also collectively think it important that we overcome this 
avoidance and engage in the difficult but important direct engagement with values related to our 
health.  If this is true of us, collectively, we might think it important to avoid nudging patients in 
either direction. 
 How do we know when we are in a context in which it is important for people to engage 
directly with values?  These areas of decision will likely include “big personal decisions” that 
“address matters that comprise some of the primary bases of a meaningful or fulfilling life” (Tsai 
2014), but might also include “space to make even trivial choices purely on the basis of the small, 
specific reasons that trivial options provide” (Shiffrin 2004).  Returning to the example of the 
city’s health insurance plan, the decision about which health care plan to enroll in might be such 
a decision, but whether it deserves this sort of protection will depend on questions about how 
important it is for individuals to make decisions about health insurance and on how important it 
is to maintain relatively direct democratic control of the choice architecture surrounding such 
decisions.  This is a question that we must resolve by examining the values of healthcare, and 
determining whether decisions about insurance are the sort that merit insulation from other 
considerations than those that have to do with health, not by examining how nudges, in general, 
impact decision-making by nudgees. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 The moral philosophers’ objection to nudges claimed that nudges fail to adequately 
respect nudgees as choosers.  I argued that it is implausible to interpret this objection to nudges 
as an objection to nudges reducing the number of options or choices that nudgees have, or an 
objection to nudges attempting to elicit a specific behavior other than through rational persuasion.  
A better interpretation of the objection to nudges is that nudges can make it more difficult for 
nudgees to democratically control the choice architecture in which they make decisions by 
remaining more hidden than other interventions, like mandates.  But whether it is really 
objectionable to make choice architecture more hidden and more difficult to democratically 
control depends on how important the choices that the architecture shapes are to the people who 
make them.  It is particularly in the context of choices where it is important for people to directly 
engage with a certain set of values that we might worry that nudges undermine democratic 
control of choice architecture, and this determination depends on substantive considerations 
about the situations in which people should have at least limited opportunities to engage with 
certain values directly.  What is left of the moral philosophers’ objection to nudges is not a claim 
that that there is a pro tanto reason to avoid nudging, but that as a psychological matter, because 
nudges may be more hidden than other policy interventions, we might wish to pay special 
attention to the possibility that nudges can undermine the independence of decisions in choice 
contexts that ought to be insulated. 
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